

13 August 1974

(8)

Note for: Bev  
Mary Ellen  
Sharon

Following (FYI) is the distribution given the estimate done yesterday (13 Aug) on Turkish Military Capabilities on Cyprus. It was LDX'd to State/Sisco, WH/Kissinger, Pentagon/dePoix.

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INDICO

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OpsCenter

S E C R E T

001-058-74


13 August 1974

## TURKISH MILITARY CAPABILITIES ON CYPRUS

1. The Turks can, with the forces presently available to them on Cyprus, establish within three to six days a line of control across the island to include the "one third" of its territory that they have envisaged as an essentially Turkish area. Fighting would go on behind this line for some time, as pockets of Greek Cypriot resistance were cleared up. The Turks could bring in reinforcements, but these would not be essential for their immediate objectives. We define these objectives as the establishment of a line from Morphou to Famagusta through or more likely around Nicosia and including the Nicosia airport in the Turkish zone.

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2. Resistance by UN and/or UK forces would not significantly affect this outcome, except possibly in the immediate environs of Famagusta.



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S E C R E T

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3. The Soviets would not be able to bring significant forces to bear in the Cyprus arena. Their option would be to develop military/psychological pressures along Turkey's land frontiers, although they might also support Athens by flying in supplies to mainland Greece.

4. The mainland Greeks would not be able to reinforce the island in a way that would affect the outcome. The Karamanlis government would probably survive while the Turkish operation was going on, but if the Turkish move was not reversed through either military or political action by the US or NATO, Karamanlis' chances of staying in power would be very small. Greek withdrawal from NATO would be likely in these circumstances.


5. If the Turks went for broader objectives (i.e. sought to impose military control over Cyprus as a whole or seal off all possible entry points), they could probably do it, against Greek Cypriot opposition, but it would probably take them several weeks, the operation would be bloody, and they would need reinforcements.

6. The rough balance of forces on Cyprus at this time is as follows:

<u>Ground</u>	32,000 Turkish troops
	45,000 Greek Cypriot National Guard and
	Greek mainland officers

S E C R E T

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
4,400 United Nations

Air

Turkish air force (600 operationally assigned aircraft) is available.

Greek air force (400 operationally assigned aircraft) is not available; its fighters are at outer limits of their combat ranges.

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Navy

Turkish navy (100+ combat ships and 60 amphibious craft) is available for operations with air cover.

Greek navy (60+ combat ships and 60-odd amphibious craft) is unable to operate successfully around Cyprus for lack of effective air cover.

STATINTL

A copy of this memorandum and distribution was given to J. [REDACTED] on 12 February 1975 at her request.

Approved by Mr. Lehman



The Honorable  
Joseph Sisco  
MEMORANDUM FOR: Department of State

Per your request.

W. E. Colby  
Director

13 August 1974  
(DATE)

FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101  
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Acting Assistant Secretary  
for European Affairs  
Wells Stabler  
Department of State

This was done in response to a  
request from Under Secretary Sisco.

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NIO/WE

13 Aug 74

(DATE)

FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101  
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(47)

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable  
Henry A. Kissinger  
White House

This was done in response to  
a request from Under Secretary  
Sisco.

W. E. Colby  
Director

13 August 1974  
(DATE)

FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101  
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(47)

MEMORANDUM FOR: Adm. Vincent P. dePoix  
Director, DIA  
The Pentagon

This was done in response to  
a request from Under Secretary  
Sisco.

W. E. Colby  
Director

13 August 1974  
(DATE)

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